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BOOK REVIEWS
The Year of our Lord 1943: Christian Humanism in an Age of Crisis. Alan Jacobs. Oxford University 
Press, 2018. 280pp. ISBN:978-0190864651. Reviewed by Dr. Walker Cosgrove, Associate Professor 
of History, Dordt University.
I wrestle often with matters of faith and the ways 
it ought to shape me as a human, though rarely do 
I arrive at satisfactory answers. When I first saw the 
publication of the newest book by Alan Jacobs—
Distinguished Professor of Humanities in the Honors 
Program and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the 
Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University, 
as well as author of many notable, diverse books on 
religion and literature—I thought it could possibly 
assist me. I was immediately drawn to it because in 
my early 20s I ransacked many used bookstores for 
works by the key literary figures discussed in Jacobs’ 
book, in particular T.S. Eliot, C.S. Lewis, and W.H. 
Auden; as well, I have turned to Jacques Maritain and 
Simone Weil in subsequent years, who are also Jacobs’ 
main subjects.
Upon reading this book, I realized that I was not 
wrong to think it would help. However, I did not 
foresee Jacobs’ tone of pessimism at the end, which 
left me with more questions than answers.
At its core, this book is about five “humanistic” 
intellectuals active in 1943 and beyond—Eliot, Lewis, 
Auden, Maritain, and Weil—who attempted to cast 
a vision for Western society after the Second World 
War, a vision in which Christianity played a central 
role in the rebuilding process (xv). As Jacobs writes, 
“The war raised for each of the thinkers I have named 
a pressing set of questions about the relationship 
between Christianity and the Western democratic 
social order, especially about whether Christianity was 
uniquely suited to the moral underpinning of that 
order” because each thought that the entrenchment of 
positivism and relativism in society led to a politics of 
power, which made the West as morally suspect and as 
dangerous as Hitler (xvi, 9, 13).
A major challenge Jacobs faced with this book is 
that these intellectuals do not form a cohesive group 
and did not directly interact much; all that holds 
them together is that as Christians, each struggled 
against the West’s descent into technocracy. That said, 
Jacobs is successful in providing a unifying theme 
to his otherwise diverse cast of characters, namely, 
that they were Christian humanists who feared the 
unbridled power and force leading to technocratic 
empires and the kind of post-human society we are 
experiencing today. To combat these dark trends, they 
encouraged society to re-engage its Christian heritage, 
particularly through a specific vision of educating the 
next generation in the line of Augustine’s notion of 
ordo amoris (137).
In chapter 2—which along with chapter 1 provides 
the intellectual background for the rest of the book—
Jacobs explores the first half of the book’s subtitle, 
“Christian Humanism,” emphasizing the literary bent 
of his subjects. Here, which is in some sense a defense 
of his whole project, Jacobs connects his subjects with 
humanists of the early Italian Renaissance, since both 
thought that literature possesses a certain power to 
transform individuals and societies in more humane 
ways. He argues that while these thinkers focused on 
literature and not philosophy or theology, they were 
no less theological or Christian for doing so (39). He 
is quick to add that none of these thinkers, other than 
Maritain, thought of themselves as humanists. But, 
with the early Italian humanists of the 14th through 
16th centuries, they desired a kind of restoration of 
society through a vision cast by literature and the arts 
(50).
The “crisis” in the second half of the subtitle of 
Jacobs’ book, “An Age of Crisis,” is about what vision 
would be cast for the future of the post-war West. 
While Lewis abhorred Nazism, he thought that 
what was equally dangerous was a kind of unbridled 
nationalism that emphasized self-interest and the 
politics of power over anything else, and which also 
attached the church and Christianity to any national 
cause (9, 11). Lewis feared that absent higher ends, 
especially if the state co-opted the church, leaders will 
base their ideas of justice and peace on the interest 
of a powerful nation-state. Instead of seeking the 
flourishing of humanity, the state then pursues the 
entrenchment of the powerful and wealthy, and it uses 
people to achieve this end (16). He suggests that this is 
seen mostly clearly when society replaces First Things 
with Second Things, arguing in The Weight of Glory 
that part of the problem is that society absolutized 
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politics and moved people to the periphery (56, 61).
In his reflections on power, Auden compares 
mid-20th century Europe with the Roman empire 
from Augustus to Constantine (79-80). For Auden, 
according to Jacobs, great care had to be put into 
any sort of Christian renewal of society because the 
danger of the state co-opting the church was strong. 
Auden points to Christianity under Constantine, 
which became a means to an end, namely the thing 
that would save the Roman Empire (81). Reflecting 
on Auden’s ideas, Jacobs writes,
And what is Caesar? What President Eisen-
hower, in his farewell address to the nation in 
1961, called the “military-industrial complex”; 
what Michel Foucault called the “power-
knowledge regime”; what Auden himself in 
“New Year Letter” had called “the machine.” 
In a word, Caesar is Force (82).
For Auden, the only possible end of Force and 
power is the birth of Jesus Christ, as he writes, “This 
Child marks the end of the machine, the end of the 
military-industrial complex, the end of force” (85, 
italics original).
Similar to Auden, Weil saw “Force” as the dark 
underbelly of Western history since the Greco-Roman 
era. She was unsure if the West had developed a 
counternarrative to the Iliad, that great epic about 
force, and as Jacobs writes, “In the three remaining 
years of her life, Weil would devote much of her 
intellectual energy to the attempt to ask what might 
prompt and ground an authentic and adequate answer 
to Homer’s ‘poem of force,’ and epic of another power, 
another ethos” (94). She also worried about the lure of 
power and force for the church in its attempt to bring 
the gospel to the world, and locates this problem not 
with Constantine but rather the Gothic era of the high 
medieval world (96-97). That said, when the church 
eschews power, it fulfills its fullest potential, as Weil 
writes, “…the conviction was suddenly borne in upon 
me that Christianity is preeminently the religion of 
slaves, that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I 
among others” (57). The only way to combat Force, 
according to her, is through humility and spiritual 
poverty, and the church is most successful in its 
humility and weakness (157-158).
Jacobs’ book builds to a crescendo in the answer 
these intellectuals provided for the problem of the 
post-war West. The West got to the brink of destroying 
itself because of poor education, and thus the mid-
twentieth-century Christian humanists attempted to 
cast their visions for true education as the solution for 
the rebuilding efforts (xiv, xv, 36). It was essential that 
Christian virtue and truth had to infuse these efforts 
because, as Lewis writes, “war creates no absolutely 
new situation; it simply aggravates the permanent 
human situation so that we can no longer ignore it. 
Human life has always been lived on the edge of a 
precipice” (103). The end of the war was not the end 
of the problem but was instead the moment to begin 
addressing it more intentionally.
For these intellectuals, education—and thus 
cultural formation and rebirth—ought to be properly 
centered around formation, or becoming more fully 
human, rather than simply the accumulation of 
pragmatic information. As Auden writes, lack of good 
teaching means that students do “not wish to become 
wise, only to be wise, to graduate cum laude” (145), 
which Jacobs follows with, “[Auden] thereby drives a 
wedge between the quest for genuine wisdom and the 
desire to be academically (and then, of course, socially 
and economically) successful” (145-146).
As well, Jacobs writes this about Maritain:
The best summary I can make of Maritain’s 
subtle argument goes like this: “Though in-
tuition and love cannot be taught directly, it 
is the task of the teacher to help form young 
people so that when the opportunity comes, 
outside of school, for them to acquire intu-
ition and love, they will be prepared to do so. 
Teachers, then, play a pivotal role in the build-
ing and sustaining of meaningful human cul-
ture: if they do not intervene in young people’s 
lives, in the indirect yet distinctive way that 
only they can, the culture will surely, if slowly, 
fall.” (127)
It is easy to criticize despotic totalitarianism of 
the 20th century for destroying true human culture; 
however, Maritain was equally concerned about 
dangers of pragmatism in the west and its influence 
on the future of education and culture in western 
democracies. It seems clear that in the nearly 80 years 
since the end of the Second World War, Maritain 
prophetically predicted the technocratic pragmatism 
that undergirds much of the American economy. He 
thought post-war society was not educating in a truly 
human way but merely training each person to become 
a tool of a technocratic society, leading, ultimately, to 
the death of genuine humane culture (129-130).
Whether intentional or not, Jacobs’ book ends 
on a note of pessimism. The final chapter examines 
these intellectuals post-1943, when they realize that 
the post-war will go in a different direction than the 
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one for which all in their own ways advocated, and 
thus all move into different projects disconnected 
to their war-year efforts. The sense one gets is that 
they all give up, with the exception of Weil, who 
had already died by this point (170ff, 190ff). In the 
afterward Jacobs concentrates on Jacques Ellul, and 
the ways in which Ellul moves in a different direction 
from these intellectuals as he thinks about Christian 
life in a post-Christian world. It is hard to know if 
Jacobs is optimistic or pessimistic about the place of 
the Christian intellectual in helping to shape the world 
today. While he lauds his subjects, ultimately he has to 
admit that “they came perhaps a century too late, after 
the reign of technocracy had become so complete that 
none can foresee the end of it while this world lasts” 
(206). And he seems to know, or at least hope, that 
another generation of thinkers will rise and attempt 
to shape the patterns of culture. But he also seems to 
question whether or not they will arise on time, or 
show up too late like these thinkers (206).
Jacobs’ book is well worth a read by anyone 
interested in wrestling with the Christian’s role in 
post-Christian society, those interested in any of 
these literary figures particularly, or even those who 
simply enjoy Jacobs’ prose. One of the most enjoyable 
aspects of this book for me is Jacobs’ readings on a 
variety of texts by these intellectuals. At times, it was 
almost as if I had the opportunity to eavesdrop in a 
Jacobs’ seminar on these writers, and as a result I look 
forward to carving out time to reread many of these 
texts. Alan Jacobs has my thanks for writing this book 
that has shaped my subsequent thinking, teaching, 
and writing.
Understanding Ignorance: The Surprising Impact of What We Don’t Know. Daniel R. DeNicola. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017. 250 pp. ISBN 978-0-262-03644-3. Reviewed by Dr. Carl P. 
Fictorie, Professor of Chemistry, Dordt University.
In Understanding Ignorance, Daniel DeNicola 
invites us into a paradox, an attempt to understand 
what we don’t know. Early in the book, he 
acknowledges this paradox and confronts possible 
objections to his efforts to understand ignorance: 
“[p]rofessing to write a whole book on ignorance,” he 
says, “reeks of clever irony and invites sarcasm” (10). 
Yet the paradox of the title drew me into reading this 
book. I learned that there is a wealth of knowledge 
about ignorance, and understanding facets of our 
ignorance aids in our understanding our knowledge. 
In this comprehensive but not exhaustive overview, 
DeNicola shows that understanding something 
about ignorance is very helpful to knowledge and 
wisdom.
DeNicola is Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg 
College, and while the book is philosophical in tone, 
it is not overly technical, so it meets his goal of being 
approachable by a wide range of readers (xii). At the 
same time, the book serves as groundwork for the 
development of a new field of epistemology that 
integrates knowledge and ignorance into a single 
discipline (13, 208). Time will tell whether that goal 
was achieved and whether this field takes hold in 
academic circles.
In the opening chapter, DeNicola provides his 
impetus for studying ignorance. He surveys modern 
Western culture and observes a “tenacious strain of 
anti-intellectualism in American life” (7). Published 
in 2017, Understanding Ignorance was presumably 
written just before or at the start of Donald Trump’s 
term as president, and the author clearly sees and 
laments the era of “fake news” in this larger anti-
intellectual context. It is precisely because of this 
anti-intellectualism that a book such as this is 
needed. DeNicola reminds us that Western culture 
from the time of Socrates has placed great value on 
knowledge while viewing ignorance as a vice (9). As 
we progress through the book, the author argues 
that not all knowledge is good and not all ignorance 
is bad. In fact, understanding ignorance is, for the 
author, necessary if we are to gain knowledge.
A nuanced discussion of two conceptual 
challenges is the subject of the second chapter. First, 
DeNicola describes ignorance as a negative concept, 
one which indicates the absence of something, in this 
case the lack of knowledge (16). This concept can 
become problematic when we try to treat this lack as 
a real entity in and of itself. The author suggests that 
“ignorance implies the capacity to learn,” making 
ignorance a key part of the structure of knowledge 
(18). 
The second conceptual challenge is the paradox 
that to try to understand ignorance must necessarily 
destroy that ignorance with knowledge, the problem 
implied in the title of the book. However, DeNicola 
argues that this is conflating the concept of ignorance 
with the content or subject of that ignorance. It is 
possible to know that one does not know something 
without specifying what that something is (19).
